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Abstract
Motivated by uncertain parameters encountered in Markov decision processes (MDPs) and stochastic games, we study the effect of
parameter uncertainty on Bellman operator-based algorithms under a set-based framework. Specifically, we first consider a family of MDPs
where the cost parameters are in a given compact set; we then define a Bellman operator acting on a set of value functions to produce a
new set of value functions as the output under all possible variations in the cost parameter. We prove the existence of a fixed point of this
set-based Bellman operator by showing that it is contractive on a complete metric space, and explore its relationship with the corresponding
family of MDPs and stochastic games. Additionally, we show that given interval set bounded cost parameters, we can form exact bounds
on the set of optimal value functions. Finally, we utilize our results to bound the value function trajectory of a player in a stochastic game.
Key words: Markov decision process, learning theory, stochastic control, multi-agent systems, learning in games, decision making and
autonomy
1 Introduction
Markov decision process (MDP) is a fundamental frame-
work for control design in stochastic environments, rein-
forcement learning, and stochastic games [2,9,13,20]. Given
cost and transition probabilities, solving an MDP is equiva-
lent to minimizing an objective in expectation, and requires
determining the optimal value function as well as deriving
the corresponding optimal policy for each state. Relying on
the fact that the optimal value function is the fixed point of
the Bellman operator, dynamic programming methods iter-
atively apply variants of the Bellman operator to converge
to the optimal value function and the optimal policy [26].
We are motivated to study MDPs where the parameters that
define the environment are sets rather than single valued.
Such a set-based perspective arises naturally in the analy-
sis of parameter uncertain MDPs and stochastic games. In
this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating MDPs
on compact sets. Specifically, we show that when the cost
parameter of the MDP is in a compact set rather than single-
valued, we can define a Bellman operator on the space of
compact sets, such that it is contractive with respect to the
Hausdorff distance. We prove the existence of a unique and
compact fixed point set that the operator must converge to,
and give interpretations of the fixed point set in the context
of parameter uncertain MDPs and stochastic games.
When modeling a system as a stochastic process, sampling
techniques are often used to determine cost and transition
probability parameters. In such scenarios, the MDP can be
either interpreted as a standard MDP with error bounds on its
parameters, or as a set-based MDP in which its parameters
are sets rather than single-valued. In the former approach,
an MDP can be solved with standard dynamic programming
methods, and the stability of its solution with respect to pa-
rameter perturbation can be analyzed locally [1,3,4]. How-
ever, these sensitivity results are only local approximations
in the context of compact parameter sets. The latter approach
is not well explored — some research exists on bounded in-
terval set MDPs [15], in which dynamic programming tech-
niques such as value and policy iteration have been shown
to converge. However, uncertain cost parameters may not
always result in interval sets; another example of a bounded
cost parameter set is a compact polytope. In this paper, we
show that in general, given an MDP with a compact set
cost parameter, it must have an associated Bellman operator
whose unique compact fixed point set contains the optimal
value function of MDPs whose single-valued cost parameter
belong to the given cost parameter set.
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As opposed to parameter uncertain MDPs where the under-
lying cost and probability parameters are constant albeit un-
certain, stochastic games result in MDPs where the cost and
probability parameters vary with opponents’ changing poli-
cies. An individual player can interpret a stochastic game
as an MDP with a parameter-varying environment, and as a
result, it does not commit to solving a fixed parameter MDP
unless a Nash equilibrium is achieved. A Nash equilibrium
defines an optimal joint policy for all players, at which no
player has any incentive to change its policy. Since every
player is performing optimally, each player’s MDP parame-
ters remain constant. In learning theory for stochastic games,
players iteratively update their individual policies to con-
verge to a Nash equilibrium. Many of the learning algorithms
are based on variants of the Bellman operator with costs and
probabilities changing at each iteration [5,23]. In this paper,
we do not focus on demonstrating convergence towards a
Nash equilibrium. Instead, we specialize the set-based MDP
framework to a single controller stochastic game, and show
that the set of Nash equilibria must be contained in the fixed
point set of a set-based Bellman operator.
In [21], we initiated our analysis of set-based MDPs by prov-
ing the existence of a unique fixed point set to the set-based
Bellman operator. In this paper, we demonstrate the signifi-
cance of this fixed point set by relating it to the fixed points
of parameter uncertain MDPs and the Nash equilibria set of
stochastic games. We further explore the fixed point set in the
context of iterative solutions to stochastic games, and show
that the fixed point set of the set-based Bellman operator
bounds the asymptotic behaviour of dynamic programming-
based learning algorithms.
The paper is structured as follows: we provide references
to existing research in Section 2; we recall definitions of
an MDP and the Bellman operator in Section 3; Section 4
extends these definitions to set-based MDPs, providing the-
oretical results for the existence of a fixed point set of a
set-based Bellman operator. Section 5 relates properties of
the fixed point set to stochastic games. An interval set-based
MDP is presented in Section 6 with a computation of exact
bounds, while the application to stochastic games is illus-
trated in Section 7, where we model unknown policies of
the opponent as cost intervals.
2 Related Research
Bounding the fixed point of the Bellman operator with uncer-
tain parameters is well studied under robust MDPs such as
in [8,31], where the value functions are bounded with a given
probability when cost and transition probability parameters
are Gaussian distributed. In contrast to our MDP model,
the cost parameters under the Gaussian distribution assump-
tion do not come from a compact set. Bounding MDPs with
reachability objectives and uncertain transition probabilities
is studied in [16]. However, the techniques utilized in [16]
require abstraction of the MDP state space and therefore do
not extend to value functions which are defined per state.
Our work is perhaps closest to that of [15], in which value
iteration and policy iteration are shown to converge for an
MDP whose cost and probability parameters are interval sets
rather than the more general compact sets that we study. Fi-
nally, we note that a generalization of [15] is given in [27],
in which an algebraic abstraction to interval sets is used to
analyze uncertain MDP parameters.
Introduced in [29], stochastic game generalizes the no-
tion of an optimal policy in MDP to a Nash equilibrium.
Learning algorithms for computing Nash equilibria can
be categorized by the assumption of perfect vs imperfect
information [14]. In this paper, our Nash equilibria analy-
sis always assumes perfect information. The computation
complexity of N player general sum stochastic games is
shown to be NP hard in [6], while value iteration for such
games is shown to diverge in [19]. However, some Bellman
operator-based algorithms will converge when constrained
to two player stochastic games or zero sum stochastic
games [10,25,29,30].
3 MDP and Bellman Operator
We introduce our notation for existing results in MDPs,
which are used throughout the paper. Contents from this
section are discussed in further detail in [26].
Notation: Sets of N elements are given by [N ] =
{0, . . . , N − 1}. We denote the set of matrices of i rows
and j columns with real or non-negative valued entries as
Ri×j or Ri×j+ , respectively. Matrices and some integers are
denoted by capital letters, X , while sets are denoted by
cursive letters, X . The set of all non-empty compact subsets
of X is denoted by H(X ). The column vector of ones is
denoted by 1N = [1, . . . , 1]T ∈ RN×1. The identity matrix
of size S × S is denoted by IS .
We consider a discounted infinite-horizon MDP defined by
([S], [A], P, C, γ), where
(1) [S] denotes the finite set of states.
(2) [A] denotes the finite set of actions. Without loss of
generality, assume that every action is admissible from
each state s ∈ [S].
(3) P ∈ RS×SA defines the transition kernel. Each com-
ponent Ps′,sa is the probability of arriving in state s′ by
taking state-action (s, a). Matrix P is column stochas-
tic and element-wise non-negative — i.e.,∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,sa = 1, ∀ (s, a) ∈ [S]× [A],
Ps′,sa ≥ 0, ∀ (s′, s, a) ∈ [S]× [S]× [A].
(1)
(4) C ∈ RS×A defines the cost matrix. Each component
Csa is the cost of state-action pair (s, a) ∈ [S]× [A].
(5) γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor.
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At each time step t, the decision maker chooses an ac-
tion a at its current state s. The state-action pair (s, a) in-
duces a probability distribution vector over states [S] as
[P1,sa, P2,sa, . . . , PS,sa]. The state-action (s, a) also induces
a cost Csa for the decision maker.
The decision maker chooses actions via a policy. We denote
a policy as a function pi : RS ×RA → [0, 1], where pi(s, a)
denotes the probability that action a is chosen at state s. The
set of all policies of an MDP is denoted by Π. Within Π, a
policy pi is deterministic if at each state s, pi(s, a) returns 1
for exactly one action, and 0 for all other possible actions.
A policy pi ∈ Π that is not deterministic is a mixed policy.
We denote the policy matrix induced by the policy pi as
Mpi ∈ RS×SA, where
(Mpi)s′,sa =
{
pi(s, a) s′ = s
0 s′ 6= s . (2)
Every policy induces a Markov chain [11], given by
MpiP
T ∈ RS×S . Each stationary policy also induces a
stationary cost given by
ν(pi) =
∑
i∈[S]
eie
T
i Mpi(1S ⊗ IA)CT ei, ν(pi) ∈ RS , (3)
where ei ∈ RS is the unit vector pointing in the ith coordi-
nate.
For an MDP ([S], [A], P, C, γ), we are interested in mini-
mizing the discounted infinite horizon expected cost, defined
with respect to a policy pi as
V ?s = min
pi∈Π
Epis
{ ∞∑
t=0
γtCstat
}
, ∀ s ∈ [S], (4)
where Epis (f) is the discounted infinite horizon expected
value of objective f , st and at are the state and action taken
at time step t, and s is the initial state of the decision maker
at t = 0.
V ?s is the optimal value function for the initial state s. The
policy pi? that achieves this optimal value is called an optimal
policy. In general, the optimal value function V ?s is unique
while the optimal policy pi? is not. The set of optimal policies
always includes at least one deterministic stationary policy
if there are no additional constraints [26, Thm 6.2.11]. If
there are additional constraints on the policy and state space,
deterministic policies may become infeasible [11].
3.1 Bellman Operator
Determining the optimal value function of a given MDP
is equivalent to solving for the fixed point of the associ-
ated Bellman operator, for which a myriad of techniques
exists [26]. We introduce the Bellman operator and its fixed
point here for the corresponding MDP problem.
Definition 1 (Bellman Operator) For a discounted infinite
horizon MDP ([S], [A], P, C, γ), its Bellman operator fC :
RS → RS is given component-wise as(
fC(V )
)
s
:= min
a
Csa+γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saVs′ , ∀ s ∈ [S]. (5)
The fixed point of the Bellman operator is a value function
V ∈ RS that is invariant with respect to the operator.
Definition 2 (Fixed Point) V ? is a fixed point of an oper-
ator F : X 7→ X iff
V ? = F (V ?). (6)
In order to show that the Bellman operator has a unique
fixed point, we consider the following operator properties.
Definition 3 (Order Preservation) LetX be a partially or-
dered space with partial order . An operator F : X → X
is an order preserving operator iff
x  x′ → F (x)  F (x′), ∀ x, x′ ∈ X .
Definition 4 (Contraction) Let (X , d) be a complete met-
ric space with metric d. An operator F : X 7→ X is a con-
tracting operator iff
d(F (x), F (x′)) < d(x, x′), ∀ x, x′ ∈ X .
The Bellman operator fC is known to have both properties
on the complete metric space (RS , ‖·‖∞). Therefore, Ba-
nach fixed point theorem can be used to show that fC has a
unique fixed point [26]. Because the optimal value function
V ? is given by the unique fixed point of the associated Bell-
man operator fC , we use the terms optimal value function
and fixed point of fC interchangeably.
In addition to obtaining V ?, MDPs are also solved to de-
termine the optimal policy, pi?. Every policy pi induces a
unique stationary value function V given by
V = ν(pi) + γMpiP
TV, (7)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and γ ∈ (0, 1).
Given a policy pi, we can equivalently solve for the station-
ary value function V as V = (I − γMpiPT )−1ν(pi). From
this perspective, the optimal value function V ? is the min-
imum vector among the set of stationary value functions
corresponding to the set of policies Π. Policy iteration algo-
rithms utilize this fact to obtain the optimal value function
V ? by iterating over the feasible policy space [26].
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Given an input value function V , we can also derive a de-
terministic optimal policy pi associated to fC(V ) as
pi(s, a) :=
1 a = argmina′∈[A] Csa′ + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,sa′Vs′
0 otherwise
,
(8)
where argmina′∈[A] returns the first optimal action a
′
if multiple actions minimize the expression Csa′ +
γ
∑
s′∈[S]Ps′,sa′Vs′ at state s. While policies that solve
fC(V ) do not need to be unique, deterministic or station-
ary, the policy pi derived from (8) will always be unique,
deterministic and stationary.
3.2 Termination Criteria for Value Iteration
Among different algorithms that solve for the fixed point of
the Bellman operator, value iteration (VI) is a commonly
used and simple technique in which the Bellman operator is
iteratively applied until the optimal value function is reached
— i.e. starting from any value function V 0 ∈ RS , we apply
V k+1s = min
a
Csa+γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saV
k
s′ , k = 1, 2, . . . . (9)
The iteration scheme given by (9) converges to the optimal
value function of the corresponding discounted infinite hori-
zon MDP. The following result presents a stopping criteria
for (9).
Lemma 5 [26, Thm. 6.3.1] For any initial value function
V 0 ∈ RS , let {V k}k∈N satisfy the value iteration given
by (9). For  > 0, if
∥∥V k+1 − V k∥∥ <  (1− γ)
2γ
,
then V k+1 is within /2 of the fixed point V ?, i.e.∥∥V k+1 − V ?∥∥ < 
2
.
Lemma 5 connects relative convergence of the sequence
{V k}k∈N to absolute convergence towards V ? by showing
that the former implies the latter. In general, the stopping
criteria differ for different MDP objectives (see [16] for re-
cent results on stopping criteria for MDPs with a reachabil-
ity objective).
4 Set-based Bellman Operator
The classic Bellman operator with respect to a cost C is
well studied. Motivated by parameter uncertain MDPs and
stochastic games, we extend the classic Bellman operator by
lifting it to operate on sets rather than individual value func-
tions in RS . For the set-based operator, we analyze its set-
based domain and prove relevant operator properties such
as order preservation and contraction. Finally, we show the
existence of a unique fixed point set V? and relate its prop-
erties to the fixed point of the classic Bellman operator.
4.1 Set-based operator properties
For the domain of our set-based operator, we define a new
metric space (H(RS), dH) based on the Banach space
(RS , ‖·‖∞) [28], where H(RS) denotes the collection of
non-empty compact subsets of RS . We equip H(RS) with
partial order, , where for V,V ′ ∈ H(RS), V  V ′ iff
V ⊆ V ′. The metric dH is the Haussdorf distance [17]
defined as
dH(V,V ′) := max{ sup
V ∈V
inf
V ′∈V′
‖V − V ′‖∞ , (10)
sup
V ′∈V′
inf
V ∈V
‖V − V ′‖∞}. (11)
Lemma 6 [17, Thm 3.3] If X is a complete metric space,
then its induced Hausdorff metric space (H(X ), dH) is a
complete metric space.
From Lemma 6, since (RS , ‖·‖∞) is a complete metric
space, H(RS) is a complete metric space with respect to
dH . On the complete metric space H(RS), we define a set-
based Bellman operator which acts on compact sets.
Definition 7 (Set-based Bellman Operator) For a family
of MDP problems, ([S], [A], P, C, γ), where C ⊂ RS×A is
a non-empty compact set, its associated set-based Bellman
operator is given by
FC(V) := cl
⋃
(C,V )∈C×V
fC(V ), ∀ V ∈ H(RS),
where cl is the closure operator.
Since FC is the union of uncountably many bounded sets,
the resulting set may not be bounded, and therefore it is not
immediately obvious that FC(V) maps into the metric space
H(RS).
Proposition 8 If C is non-empty and compact, then
FC(V) ∈ H(RS), ∀ V ∈ H(RS).
PROOF. For a non-empty compact subset A of a finite
dimensional real vector space, we define its diameter as
diam (A) = supx,y∈A ‖x− y‖∞. The diameter of a set in
a metric space is finite if and only if it is bounded [28].
Take any non-empty compact set V ∈ H(RS). As FC(V) ⊆
RS , it suffices to prove that FC(V) is closed and bounded.
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The closedness is guaranteed by the closure operator. A
subset of a metric space is bounded iff its closure is bounded.
Hence, to prove the boundedness, it suffices to prove that
diam
(∪(C,V )∈C×VfC(V )) < +∞. For any two cost-value
function pairs (C, V ), (C ′, V ′) ∈ C × V ,
fC(V )−fC′(V ′) =
(
fC(V )−fC′(V )
)
+
(
fC′(V )−fC′(V ′)
)
.
(12)
We bound (12) by bounding the two terms on the
right hand side separately. The second term satisfies
‖fC′(V )− fC′(V ′)‖∞ ≤ γ ‖V − V ′‖∞ , due to contrac-
tion properties of fC′ . To bound the first term, we note that
for any two vectors a, b ∈ RS ,
‖a− b‖∞ = max{max(a− b),max(b− a)}, (13)
where the operator max{} denote maximum element, and
max(a) denote maximum component of vector a. Evaluating
fC(V )− fC′(V ) with (13),
max(fC′(V )− fC(V ))
≤max(ν′(pi) + γMpiPTV − ν(pi)− γMpiPTV )
≤max
(
ν′(pi)− ν(pi)
)
≤
∑
i∈[S]
∥∥eTi ∥∥∞ ‖Mpi‖∞ ‖1S ⊗ IA‖∞ ∥∥(C ′ − C)T∥∥∞ ‖ei‖2∞ ,
where pi is an optimal policy corresponding to fC′ .
Since ‖1S ⊗ IA‖∞ = ‖ei‖∞ =
∥∥eTi ∥∥∞ = ‖Mpi‖∞ = 1 for
any pi ∈ Π, max(fC′(V )− fC(V )) ≤ S diam
(CT ). Simi-
larly, we can show max(fC(V )−fC′(V )) ≤ S diam
(CT ).
Finally it follows from (12) that
‖fC(V )− fC′(V ′)‖∞ ≤ S diam
(CT )+ γ diam (V) .
(14)
Since (14) holds for all (C, V ), (C ′, V ′) ∈ C × V
then diam
(∪(C,V )∈C×VfC(V )) ≤ S diam (CT ) +
γ diam (V) < +∞ as both CT and V are bounded. 2
Proposition 8 shows that FC is an operator from H(RS) to
H(RS). Having established the space which FC operates
on, we can draw many parallels between FC and fC . Simi-
lar to fC having a fixed point V ? in the real vector space,
we consider whether a unique fixed point set V? which sat-
isfies FC(V?) = V? exists. To take the comparison fur-
ther, since V ? is optimal for an MDP problem defined by
([S], [A], P, C, γ), we consider if V? correlates to the fam-
ily of optimal value functions that correspond to the MDP
family ([S], [A], P, C, γ). We explore these parallels in this
paper, prove the existence of a unique fixed point V? for the
set-based Bellman operator FC , and derive sufficient condi-
tions for its existence.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of V? by utilizing the
Banach fixed point theorem [26], which states that a unique
fixed point must exist for all contraction operators on com-
plete metric spaces. First, we show that FC has properties
given in Definitions 3 and 4 on the complete metric space
(H(RS), dH).
Proposition 9 For any V ∈ H(RS) and C ⊂ RS×A closed
and bounded, FC is an order preserving and a contracting
operator in the Hausdorff distance.
PROOF. Consider V , V ′ ∈ H(RS) which satisfy V ⊆ V ′,
then
FC(V) = cl
⋃
(C,V )
∈C×V
fC(V ) ⊆ cl
⋃
(C,V ′)
∈C×V′
fC(V
′) = FC(V ′).
We conclude that FC is order-preserving. To see that FC is
contracting, we need to show
sup
V ∈FC(V)
inf
V ′∈FC(V′)
‖V − V ′‖∞ < dH(V,V ′) (15)
sup
V ′∈FC(V′)
inf
V ∈FC(V)
‖V − V ′‖∞ < dH(V,V ′), (16)
First we note that taking sup (inf) of a continuous
function over the closure of a set A is equivalent
to taking the sup (inf) over A itself. Furthermore,
fC(V ) ∈ ∪(C,V )∈C×VfC(V ) iff (C, V ) ∈ C × V . There-
fore taking the sup(inf) of ‖V − V ′‖∞ over V ∈ FC(V) is
equivalent to taking the sup(inf) of ‖fC(V )− fC′(V ′)‖∞
over (C, V ) ∈ C × V .
Given V,V ′ ∈ H(RS) and for arbitrary V ∈ V , C ∈ C,
inf
(C′,V ′)
∈C×V′
‖fC(V )− fC′(V ′)‖∞ (17a)
≤ inf
(C′,V ′)
∈C×V′
S
∥∥(C − C ′)T∥∥∞ + γ ‖V − V ′‖∞ (17b)
≤S ∥∥(C ′ − C ′)T∥∥∞ + infV ′∈V′γ ‖V − V ′‖∞ (17c)
≤γ inf
V ′∈V′
‖V − V ′‖∞ , (17d)
where in (17b) we take the upper bound derived in Propo-
sition (8). In (17c) we haven chosen the matrix C = C ′
to minimize
∥∥(C − C ′)T∥∥∞. This eliminates the cost term
and we arrive at (17d).
Then (15) and (16) simplifies to
sup
V ∈FC(V)
inf
V ′∈FC(V′)
‖V − V ′‖∞ ≤ γ sup
V ∈V
inf
V ′∈V′
‖V − V ′‖∞ ,
and
sup
V ′∈FC(V′)
inf
V ∈FC(V)
‖V − V ′‖∞ ≤ γ sup
V ′∈V′
inf
V ∈V
‖V − V ′‖∞ .
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Therefore dH(FC(V), FC(V ′)) ≤ γdH(V,V ′). Since γ ∈
(0, 1), FC is a contracting operator on H(RS). 2
The contraction property of FC implies that any repeated
application of the operator to a V0 ∈ H(RS) will result in
closer consecutive sets in the Hausdorff distance. It is then
natural to consider if there is a unique set which all FC(Vk)
converges to.
Theorem 10 There exists a unique fixed point V? of the set-
based Bellman operator FC as defined in Definition 1, such
that FC(V?) = V?, and V? is a closed and bounded set in
RS .
Furthermore, for any set V0 ∈ H(RS), the iteration
Vk+1 = FC(Vk), (18)
converges in the Haussdorf distance — i.e.,
lim
k→∞
dH(FC(Vk),V?) = 0.
PROOF. As shown in Proposition 9, FC is a contracting
operator. From the Banach fixed point theorem [26, Thm
6.2.3], there exists a unique fixed point V?, and any arbitrary
V0 ∈ H(RS) will generate a sequence of sets {FC(Vk)}k∈N
that converges to V?. 2
4.2 Properties of fixed point set
In the case of the Bellman operator fC on metric space RS ,
the fixed point V ? corresponds to the optimal value function
of the MDP associated with cost C. Because there is no
direct association of an MDP problem to the set of cost
parameters C, we cannot claim the same for the set-based
Bellman operator and V?. However, V? does have many
interesting properties on H(RS), especially in terms of set-
based value iteration (18).
We consider the following generalization of value iteration:
suppose that instead of a fixed cost parameter, we have that at
each iteration k, aCk that is randomly chosen from the com-
pact set of cost parameters C. In general, limk→∞ fCk(V k)
may not exist. However, we can infer from Theorem 10 that
the sequence {V k} converges to the set V? in the Hausdorff
distance.
Proposition 11 Let {Ck}k∈N ⊆ C be a sequence of costs
in C, where C is a compact set within RS×A. Let us define
the iteration
V k+1 = fCk(V
k),
for any V 0 ∈ RS . Then the sequence {V k}k∈N satisfies
lim
k→∞
inf
V ∈V?
∥∥fCk(V k)− V ∥∥∞ = 0,
where V? is the unique fixed point set of the operator FC .
PROOF. Define V0 = {V 0}, then from Definition 7 and
Definition 1, V k+1 = fCk(V k) ∈ FC(Vk) for all k ≥ 0.
At each iteration k, Vk+1 = FC(Vk). From Theo-
rem 10, Vk converges to V? in Hausdorff distance,
limk→∞ dH(Vk,V?) = 0. Therefore for every δ > 0,
there exists K such that for all k ≥ K, dH(Vk,V?) < δ.
Since fCk(V k) ∈ Vk+1, infV ∈V?
∥∥fCk(V k)− V ∥∥∞ ≤
dH(Vk+1,V?) < δ must also be true for all k ≥ K. There-
fore limk→∞ infV ∈V?
∥∥fCk(V k)− V ∥∥∞ = 0. 2
Proposition 11 implies that regardless of whether or not
the sequence {fCk(V k)}k∈N converges, the sequence {V k}
must asymptotically approach V?. This has important in-
terpretations in the game setting that is further explored in
Section 5. On the other hand, Proposition 11 also implies
that if limk→∞ V k does converge, its limit point must be an
element of V?.
Corollary 12 We define the set of fixed points of fC for each
C ∈ C as
U =
⋃
C∈C
{V ∈ RS | fC(V ) = V },
i.e., U is the set of optimal value functions for the set of
MDPs ([S], [A], P, C, γ) where C ∈ C. Furthermore, we
consider all sequences {Ck}k∈N ⊆ C such that for V 0 ∈
RS , the iteration V k+1 = fCk(V k) approaches a limit point
V = limk→∞ V k, and define the set of all such limit points
as
W =
⋃
{Ck}k∈N⊆C
{V ∈ RS | lim
k→∞
fCk(V
k) = V, where
V 0 ∈ RS , V k+1 = fCk(V k), k = 0, 1, . . .},
(19)
then U ⊆ W ⊆ V?.
PROOF. For any V ∈ W and V ? ∈ V?,
‖V ? − V ‖∞ ≤
∥∥V ? − fCk(V k)∥∥∞ + ∥∥fCk(V k)− V ∥∥∞
is satisfied for all k ∈ N. Furthermore, by assumption, each
V ∈ W has an associated iteration V k+1 = fCk(V k) whose
limit point is equal to V , i.e. limk→∞
∥∥fCk(V k)− V ∥∥∞ =
0. Additionally,
lim
k→∞
inf
V ?∈V?
∥∥fCk(V k)− V ?∥∥∞ = 0,
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follows from Proposition 11. Therefore,
lim
k→∞
inf
V ?∈V?
‖V ? − V ‖∞ ≤ 0.
From the fact that the infimum over a compact set is always
achieved for an element of the set [28], V = V ? ∈ V?.
Therefore W ⊆ V?. To see that U ⊆ W , take Ck = C for
all k = 0, 1, . . ., then U ⊆ W . 2
Remark 13 We make the distinction between V?, W , and
U to emphasize that V? is not simply the set of fixed points
corresponding to fC for all possible C ∈ C, given by U , or
the limit points of fCk for all possible sequences {Ck}k∈N ⊂
C, given by W . The fixed point set V? contains all possible
limiting trajectories of {fCk(V k)}k∈N without assuming a
limit point exists.
In Corollary 12, U can be easily understood as the set
of optimal value functions for the set of standard MDPs
([S], [A], P, C, γ) generated by C ∈ C. An interpretation
for W is perhaps less obvious. We show in Section 7 that
W corresponds to the set of limit points that result from
the best response dynamics of a two player single controller
stochastic game, as defined in the Section 5.
We summarize our results on set-based Bellman operator as
the following: given a compact set of cost parameters C, FC
converges to a unique compact set V?. The set V? contains
all the fixed points of fC for C ∈ C. Furthermore, V? also
contains the limit points of fCk(V k) for any {Ck}k∈N ⊆ C,
V 0 ∈ RS , given that limk→∞ V k converges. Even if the
limit does not exist, V k must asymptotically converge to V?
in the Hausdorff distance.
5 Stochastic Games
In this section, we further elaborate on the properties of
the fixed point set V? in the context of stochastic games,
and show that with an appropriate over-approximation of
the Nash equilibria cost parameters, V? contains the optimal
value functions for player one at Nash equilibria.
A stochastic game extends a standard MDP to a multi-agent
competitive setting [29]. We specifically focus on games
with two players. As opposed to standard MDPs, the cost and
and transition probabilities C and P for each player depends
on the joint policy, pi = (pi1, pi2), where pi1 and pi2 are
respectively player one and player two’s policies as defined
for standard MDPs in Section 3. The set of joint policies
is given by Π, and the set of policies for player one and
player two is given by Π1 and Π2, respectively. We denote
the actions of player one by a and the actions of player two
by b. The transition kernel of the game is determined by the
tensor Q ∈ RS×S×A×A, where Q satisfies∑
s′∈[S]
Qs′sab = 1, ∀ (s, a, b) ∈ [S]× [A]× [A],
Qs′sab ≥ 0, ∀ (s′, s, a, b) ∈ [S]× [S]× [A]× [A].
Each player’s cost Di ∈ RS×A×A also depends on the joint
policy, where D1sab and D
2
sab denote player one and player
two’s cost when the joint action (a, b) is taken from state s,
respectively. With the same notation of Section 3, we denote
the transition kernel for player one when player two applies
policy pi2 as P 1(pi2), where
P 1(pi2) ∈ RS×SA, P 1s′,sa(pi2) =
∑
b∈[A]
(pi2)sbQs′sab. (20)
Similarly, let the cost of player one be denoted as
C1(pi2) ∈ RS×A, C1sa(pi2) =
∑
b∈[A]
(pi2)sbD
1
sab, (21)
when player two takes on policy pi2. Player two’s cost
C2(pi1) and transition kernel P 2(pi1) can be similarly de-
fined. Each player then solves a discounted MDP given
by ([S], [A], P i(pij), Ci(pij), γi). Since each player only
controls part of the joint action space, the generalization to
joint action space introduces non-stationarity in the tran-
sition and cost, when viewed from the perspective of an
individual player solving an MDP.
We assume that both players have perfect information —
i.e. both players can fully observe the joint policy as well as
predict future states’ probability distributions.
Given a joint policy (pi1, pi2), each player attempts to min-
imize its value function. Each player’s optimal discounted
infinite horizon expected cost is given by
Vs = min
pii∈Πi
Epiis
{ ∞∑
t=0
γtiC
i
stat(pij)
}
, ∀ s ∈ [S]. (22)
As formulated by (22), we denote the value function of
player one by V ∈ RS and the value function of player
two by W ∈ RS . Given a joint policy pi, both players have
unique stationary value functions
(
V (pi1, pi2),W (pi1, pi2)
)
given by
V (pi1, pi2) =ν
1(pi1, pi2) + γ1Mpi1P
1(pi2)
TV (pi1, pi2),
(23a)
W (pi1, pi2) =ν
2(pi1, pi2) + γ2Mpi2P
2(pi1)
TW (pi1, pi2),
(23b)
where ν1(pi1, pi2) =
∑
i∈[S] eie
T
i Mpi1(1s ⊗ IA)C1(pi2)T ei
and ν2(pi1, pi2) =
∑
i∈[S] eie
T
i Mpi2(1s ⊗ IA)C2(pi1)T ei
Since a stochastic game can be viewed as coupled MDPs,
the MDP notion of optimality must be expanded to reflect
dependency of a player’s individual optimal policy on the
joint policy space. We define a Nash equilibrium in terms
of each player’s value function [13, Sec.3.1].
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Definition 14 [Two Player Nash Equilibrium] A joint policy
pi? = (pi?1 , pi
?
2) is a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding
value functions as given by (23) satisfy
V (pi?1 , pi
?
2) ≤ V (pi1, pi?2), ∀ pi1 ∈ Π1,
W (pi?1 , pi
?
2) ≤W (pi?1 , pi2), ∀ pi2 ∈ Π2.
We denote the Nash equilibrium value functions as V ? =
V (pi?1 , pi
?
2), W
? = W (pi?1 , pi
?
2) and the set of Nash equilibria
for a stochastic game as ΠNE ⊂ Π.
Definition 14 implies that a Nash equilibrium is achieved
when the joint policy simultaneously generates value func-
tions V ? and W ? which are the fixed points of the Bellman
operator with respect to parameters
(
C1(pi2), P
1(pi2)
)
and
(
C2(pi1), P
2(pi1)
)
, respectively — i.e. V ? =
min
pi1∈Π1
{
ν1(pi1, pi2) + γ1Mpi1P
1(pi?2)
TV ?
}
, and W ? =
min
pi2∈Π2
{
ν2(pi1, pi2) + γ2Mpi2P
2(pi?1)
TW ?
}
.
A Nash equilibrium is not unique for general sum stochastic
games. Furthermore, Nash equilibria policies are not neces-
sarily composed of deterministic individual policies. There-
fore while each player’s Nash equilibrium value function is
always the fixed point of the associated Bellman operator,
the Nash equilibrium policy for each player is not the opti-
mal deterministic policy associated to the Nash equilibrium
value function in general. The existence of at least one Nash
equilibrium for any general sum stochastic game is given
in [13]. When the stochastic game is also zero sum, the Nash
equilibrium is also unique.
In this paper, we focus on non-stationarity in the cost term
only and leave non-stationary in the probability kernel term
to future analysis. Specifically, we constrain our analysis to
a single controller game [12,13], i.e. when the probability
transition kernel is controlled by player one only.
Definition 15 (Single controller game) A single controller
game is a two player stochastic game where the probability
transition kernel is independent of player two’s actions, i.e.,
for each (s′, s, a) ∈ [S]× [S]× [A]
Qs′sab = Qs′sab′ , ∀ b, b′ ∈ [A],
i.e. P 1(pi2) = P , ∀ pi2 ∈ Π2 and P 2(pi1)s′,sb =
P 2(pi1)s′,sb′ , ∀ b, b′ ∈ [A], pi1 ∈ Π1.
Although both players are still optimizing their value func-
tions in a single controller game, player two’s policy only af-
fects its immediate cost at each state, while its transition dy-
namics become a time-varying Markov chain. However, pi2
still affects player one’s MDP through cost matrix C1(pi2).
We analyze a single controller game from the set-based
MDP perspective by utilizing Proposition 11. Suppose we
are given a compact set C ⊂ RS×A that over-approximates
the set of CNE — i.e. cost parameters that player one ob-
serves at Nash equilibria,
CNE = {C1(pi?2) ∈ RS×A | (pi?1 , pi?2) ∈ ΠNE} ⊆ C. (24)
Then we show that the Nash equilibria value functions be-
long to the fixed point set of FC .
A valid over-approximation to CNE can always be easily
found — the simplest being the interval set of all feasible
costs.
Example 16 (Interval set approximation) An approxima-
tion to CNE can always be given by interval sets. At each
state-action pair (s, a), the MDP cost parameter for player
one is given by (21). Then we can take the maximum and min-
imum elements of the set {D1sab}b∈[A] for all state actions
pairs (s, a) to form an interval set C = C11 × . . .× CSA ∈
H(R)S×A, such that
Csa = {D1sab}b∈[A] = [Csa, Csa],
where Csa = minb∈[A]D
1
sab and Csa = maxb∈[A]D
1
sab
can be directly observed. In this case, C is an exact rep-
resentation of player one’s feasible cost parameters — i.e.
every element C ∈ C corresponds to a policy pi2, such that
C = C1(pi2).
Interval sets will always give an admissible approximation,
however more general sets such as polytopes allow addi-
tional information about Nash equilibria to be incorporated
into the fixed point set. Suppose we know that at all Nash
equilibria of a given game, the cost parameter at each state
satisfies
∑
a∈[A]GsaC
1
sa(pi
?
2) ≤ hs for constants Gsa and
hs, then a better approximation set is given by the polytope
C ∩ G, where C is the interval set in Example 16, and G is
given by
G =
{
C ∈ RS×A |
∑
a∈[A]
GsaCsa ≤ hs, ∀ s ∈ [S]
}
.
Given a compact set C that over-approximates the set of
player one’s cost parameters at Nash equilibria, CNE , we
now show that the Nash equilibria value functions for player
one must lie within V?, the fixed point set of FC .
Theorem 17 In a single controller game, let C ⊂ RS×A be
an over approximation of Nash equilibria costs for player
one as in (24). If C is compact, then the set of stationary value
functions for player one at Nash equilibria policies (23a) is
a subset of V?, the fixed point set of FC .
PROOF. We define the set of Nash equilibria value func-
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tions for player one as
VNE =
{
V ∈ RS | V = fC1(pi?2 )(V )
}
, (25)
where the Bellman operator fC1(pi?2 ) is defined with P , the
pi2-independent transition kernel for both players. For any
V ? ∈ VNE , there exists C? = C1(pi?2) ∈ C such that V ? is
the fixed point of fC? . Then from Corollary 12, V ? ∈ V?. 2
Remark 18 Although the Nash equilibrium value function
V ? is always the unique fixed point of fC? given by (5),
where C? is player one’s cost at Nash equilibrium, we note
that in general, player one’s policy at Nash equilibrium is
not the optimal deterministic policy of fC?(V ?) given by (8);
this is because Nash equilibrium is in general not composed
of deterministic individual policies, while the solution to (8)
is always deterministic.
However, if we consider the set of all deterministic policies
that solves (8), then player one’s policy at Nash equilibrium
must be a convex combination within this set [13].
We summarize the application of set-based MDP framework
to single controller stochastic games as the following: when
C over-approximates the set of costs at Nash equilibria, the
fixed point set V? of operator FC contains all of the Nash
equilibria value functions for player one in a single controller
stochastic game.
6 Application to Interval Set-Based Bellman Operator
In this section, we show that when the cost parameter set
C and the initial value function set V0 are interval sets, the
fixed point set V? of FC is also an interval set, as done simi-
larly in [15]. However, their convergence is shown under an
unconventional partial ordering. Leveraging our set-based
Bellman operator framework and the Hausdorff distance as
our metric, our result is derived in a much more straightfor-
ward manner using interval arithmetics.
As shown in Example 16, one over-approximation of the
set of Nash equilibria costs is given by interval sets. In this
section we show how to compute the fixed point set V? of
an interval set-based Bellman operator. Suppose the set C is
given by
C =
{
C ∈ RS×A |Csa ∈ [Csa, Csa], ∀ (s, a) ∈ [S]×[A]
}
.
(26)
and the input value function set is given by
V =
{
V ∈ RS | Vs ∈ [V s, V s], ∀ s ∈ [S]
}
. (27)
6.1 Hausdorff distance between interval sets
We first show that the Hausdorff distance between two inter-
val sets V,V ′ ∈ H(RS) can be computed by only compar-
ing the upper and lower bounds of the intervals themselves.
Lemma 19 For two intervals X ,Y ∈ H(RS , ‖·‖∞) given
by X = [x, x], Y = [y, y ], where x, x, y, y ∈ RS , the
Hausdorff distance between X and Y can be calculated as
dH(X ,Y) = max{
∥∥x− y∥∥∞ , ‖x− y‖∞}.
PROOF. We consider the component-wise Hausdorff dis-
tance by noting that when coupled with the infinity norm on
RS , the Hausdorff distance satisfies
dH(X ,Y) = max
i∈[S]
dH(Xi,Yi),
where X = X1 × . . .XS and Y = Y1 × . . .YS [7].
We first compute dH(Xi,Yi), where Xi = [xi, xi] and Yi =
[yi, yi] are interval sets. Recall that the infinity norm can
be written using max operators given in (13). The nested
max representation of the infinity norm allows us to directly
evaluate the infimum and suprenum of ‖xi − yi‖∞ over Xi
and Yi respectively, as
sup
yi∈Yi
inf
xi∈Xi
‖xi − yi‖∞ = max{max(xi−yi),max(yi−xi)}.
Similarly, we can derive
sup
xi∈Xi
inf
yi∈Yi
‖xi − yi‖∞ = max{max(yi−xi),max(xi−yi)}.
Finally we recall the definition of Hausdorff distance:
dH(Xi,Yi) = max{ sup
yi∈Yi
inf
xi∈Xi
‖xi − yi‖∞ ,
sup
xi∈Xi
inf
yi∈Yi
‖xi − yi‖∞}
= max{max(xi − yi),max(yi − xi),
max(yi − xi),max(xi − yi)}
= max{∥∥xi − yi∥∥∞ , ‖xi − yi‖∞}.
(28)
Then the total Hausdorff distance between X and Y is given
by
dH(X ,Y) = max
i∈[S]
{max{∥∥xi − yi∥∥∞ , ‖xi − yi‖∞}}
= max{∥∥x− y∥∥∞ , ‖x− y‖∞}.
(29)
2
Lemma 19 shows that interval sets are nice in that its Haus-
dorff distance can be derived via component-wise operations
on the boundaries of the interval. We use Lemma 19 later in
this section to obtain convergence guarantees of set-based
value iteration to the fixed point set of the interval set-based
Bellman operator.
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6.2 Interval arithmetics
To compute the fixed point of an interval set-based Bellman
operator, we introduce some relevant interval arithmetic op-
erators [24].
α[a, b] = [αa, αb], α ≥ 0,
[a, b] + [c, d] = [a+ c, b+ d],
[a, b]− [c, d] = [a− d, b− c],
min{[a, b], [c, d]} = [min{a, c},min{b, d}],
(30)
where the last operator min{[a, b], [c, d]} denotes the small-
est interval that contains {min{x, y}, | x ∈ [a, b], y ∈ [c, d]}.
The equivalence relationship for the min operator is not as
obvious as the standard addition and subtraction operators.
Here we prove that the equivalence for min operator is in-
deed as given.
Lemma 20 The min operator for interval sets can be cal-
culated as
min{[a, b], [c, d]} = [min{a, c},min{b, d}].
PROOF. Let us consider the sets A = min{[a, b], [c, d]}
and B = [min{a, c},min{b, d}]. We first show that A ⊆ B:
for z ∈ min{[a, b], [c, d]}, there exists x ∈ [a, b] and
y ∈ [c, d] such that z = min{x, y}. Then necessarily,
min{a, c} ≤ z and z ≤ min{b, d} must be satisfied.
To prove the inclusionB ⊆ A, take v ∈ [min{a, c},min{b, d}].
If v ∈ [a, b], then v = min{v,max{v, d}}. If max{v, d} =
d, then v ∈ min{[a, b], [c, d]} follows from v ∈ [a, b] and
d ∈ [c, d]. If max{v, d} = v, then d < v ≤ b. This contra-
dicts v ∈ [min{a, c},min{b, d}].
If v /∈ [a, b], then either a 6= min{a, c} or b 6= min{b, d}.
This is equivalent to either c ≤ v < a or b < v ≤ d is true.
b < v ≤ d cannot be true since v ∈ [min{a, c},min{b, d}].
c ≤ v < a implies that v ∈ [c, d] and v = min{v, a}, then
v ∈ min{[a, b], [c, d]}. 2
With Lemma 19 and 20, we can analytically compute the
fixed point set of an interval set-based Bellman operator
and give convergence guarantees of interval set-based value
iteration.
Proposition 21 For interval sets C and V given by (26)
and (27), respectively, FC(V) defined in Definition 7 is an
interval set that satisfies
FC(V) = {V | V ≤ Vu, −V ≤ −Vl, V ∈ RS},
for Vl = fC(V ) and Vu = fC(V ).
Furthermore, the sequence {Vk}k∈N generated by the iter-
ation Vk+1 = FC(Vk) starting from any interval set V0 will
converge to V? in Hausdorff distance: for every  > 0, there
exists Vk which satisfies
dH(Vk,V?) ≤ /2, (31)
where (31) is satisfied if dH(Vk,Vk−1) 2γ1−γ < .
PROOF. We recall the set-based Bellman operator Defini-
tion 7 and the component-wise definition of fC in Defini-
tion 1. Using these definitions and the fact that C = [C, C]
and V = [V , V ] are both interval sets, the set-based Bellman
operator can be written as(
FC(V)
)
s
= cl
⋃
C∈[C,C ]
V ∈[V ,V ]
min
a∈[A]
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saVs′ .
The union over interval sets can be written using interval
arithmetic notation as⋃
C∈[C,C ]
V ∈[V ,V ]
min
a∈[A]
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saVs′ (32)
= min
a∈[A]
[Csa, Csa] + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,sa[V s′ , V s′ ]. (33)
Since interval sets are closed by definition, the closure
of (32) must also equal (33). Therefore, FC(V) can be
equivalently written component-wise as(
FC(V)
)
s
= min
a∈[A]
[Csa, Csa] + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,sa[V s′ , V s′ ].
(34)
Then, γ > 0 and Ps′,sa ≥ 0 for all (s′, s, a) ∈ [S]×[S]×[A]
allow us to directly perform interval arithmetics component-
wise for FC as(
FC(V)
)
s
= min
a∈[A]
[
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saV s′ ,
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saV s′
]
(35a)
=
[
min
a∈[A]
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saV s′ ,
min
a∈[A]
Csa + γ
∑
s′∈[S]
Ps′,saV s′
]
(35b)
= [
(
fC(V )
)
s
,
(
fC(V )
)
s
], (35c)
where (35b) utilizes the interval set-based minimization de-
rived in Lemma 20, and (35c) follows from Definition 1.
The image of FC is another closed interval, as shown
by (35c). From Theorem 10, any interval set V0 =
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[V , V ] generates an iteration Vk+1 = FC(Vk) which
satisfies limk→∞ FC(Vk) = V?. We can use inter-
val arithmetics to derive V? = limk→∞ FC(Vk) =[
limk→∞ fC(V k), limk→∞ fC(V
k)
]
= [V ? , V ? ], where
V ? and V ? are the fixed points of fC and fC , respectively.
At each iteration, the Hausdorff distance between Vk and V?
is given by dH(Vk,V?) = dH
(
[fC(V
k), fC(V
k)], [V ? , V ? ]
)
.
Using Lemma 19, dH(Vk,V?) is given by
max
{∥∥fC(V k)− V ?∥∥∞ ,∥∥∥fC(V k)− V ?∥∥∥∞ }.
Similarly, dH(Vk+1,Vk) is given by
max
{∥∥fC(V k)− fC(V k+1)∥∥∞ ,∥∥∥fC(V k)− fC(V k+1)∥∥∥∞ }.
From Theorem 5, if
∥∥fC(V k)− fC(V k+1)∥∥∞ <  1−γ2γ for
some  > 0, then
∥∥fC(V k)− V ?∥∥∞ < 2 . Therefore if
dH(Vk+1,Vk) < (1−γ)2γ , then dH(Vk+1 − V?) < 2 . 2
We note that whileVk converges toV? in Hausdorff distance,
it is not an over approximation to V?. In fact, if V k > V ? for
some k ∈ N, then each V? ( Vk for all k. Nonetheless, we
can still utilize Vk to obtain an over-approximation of V? by
using estimate intervals V˜k+1 = [fC(V k)−1S, fC(V k) +
1S].
7 Numerical Example
Our analysis of set-based Bellman operator is motivated
by dynamic programming-based learning algorithms in
stochastic games. In this section, we apply interval set-based
value iteration analyze dynamic programming-based learn-
ing algorithms in a two player single controller stochastic
game, and show that both transient and asymptotic be-
haviours of player one’s value function can be bounded,
regardless of the opponent’s learning algorithm.
We consider a two player single controller stochastic game
as defined in Definition 15, where each player solves a dis-
counted MDP given by ([S], [A], P, C1,2, γ1,2). Both play-
ers share an identical state-action space ([S], [A]) as well
as the same transition probabilities P controlled by player
one’s actions. Player one’s costs are given by
C1sa(pi2) = Csa +Asbpi2(s, b), ∀ (s, a) ∈ [S]× [A],
while player two’s cost is given by
C2sb(pi1) = Csb −Asapi1(s, a), ∀ (s, b) ∈ [S]× [A],
where the matrix A ∈ R(S×A)+ is the same for the two costs.
Although convergent algorithms exist for such single con-
troller games [22,18], if the players cannot coordinate which
algorithm to use between themselves, convergence towards
a Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. In this section,
we utilize our set-based Bellman operator to show that, al-
though we cannot guarantee convergence of player one’s
value function to a Nash equilibrium value function, we can
instead determine the bounded value function set that player
one’s value function converges to, independent of the oppo-
nent’s learning algorithm.
We define the state space of a stochastic game on a 3 × 3
grid, shown in Figure 1a. The set of neighbouring states of
s, Ns, consists of states immediately connected to s by a
green arrow in Figure 1a. Furthermore, let Ns denote the
number of elements in Ns. From each state s, the actions
available are labelled ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘up’, or ‘down’, as shown
in Figure 1b.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a): Each player’s state space [S], S = 9. Green actions
leads to a neighbouring state and yellow actions are infeasible.
(b): Actions space [A], A = 4.
Each state s has actions ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘up’, and ‘down’ with
a corresponding target state in the direction of the action. If
the action is feasible, i.e. from state s, it coincides with a
green arrow in Figure 1a, then its probability distribution is
defined as
Ps′sa =

0.7 s′ = target state
0.3
Ns−1 s
′ 6= target state, s′ ∈ Ns
0 otherwise
. (36)
If action a is infeasible, i.e. from state s, it coincides with a
yellow arrow, then its probability distribution is defined as
Ps′sa =
{
1
Ns
s′ ∈ Ns
0 otherwise
. (37)
We initialize the matrix C as a random matrix, such that
each entry Csa is sampled with uniform probability from
[0, 1]. Similarly, the matrix A is also randomly initialized
such that each Asb ∈ [0, 0.1]. This allows us to derive an
interval set-based cost parameter C given by{
C1 ∈ RS×A |C1sa ∈ [Csa, Csa+Asb], ∀ (s, a) ∈ [S]×[A]
}
.
(38)
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The upper bound Csa +Asb is achieved when player two’s
probability of taking action b from state s is 1. We use C to
represent the set of cost parameters for player one for all of
player two’s policies.
We consider a two player value iteration algorithm pre-
sented in Algorithm 1 which forms the basis of many dy-
namic programming-based learning algorithms for stochas-
tic games [13,22]. At each time step, player one takes the
optimal policy pik+1 given by (8) that solves the Bellman
operator fC(V k), where C is the last time step’s cost param-
eter and V k is last time step’s value function — i.e. player
one performs value iteration at every time step. Player two
obtains its optimal policy using function g : Π1 → Π2, we
do not make any assumptions of g, it may produce any pol-
icy pi2 in response to the policy pi1.
Algorithm 1 Two player VI
Input: ([S], [A], P, C1,2, γ1,2), V0.
Output: V ?, pi?1 , pi?2
pi01(s) = pi
0
2(s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ [S]
for k = 0, . . . , do
C = C1(pik1 , pi
k
2 )
(V k+1, pik+1) = fC(V
k)
pik+12 = g(pi
k+1
1 )
end for
Our analysis provides bounds on player one’s value function
when we do not know how player two is updating its policy
— i.e. when g is unknown. In simulation, we take g to be
different strategies and show that player one’s value func-
tions are bounded by the interval set analysis and converges
towards the fixed point set of the corresponding Bellman
operator.
Suppose both players are updating their policies via value
iteration (8). Player one performs value iteration with a dis-
count factor of γ1 = 0.7, while player two performs value
iteration with an unknown discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1). As-
suming both players’ value functions are initialized to be 0
in every state, we simulate player one’s value function tra-
jectories for different values of γ in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that when player two utilizes different dis-
count factors, player one experiences different trajectories
despite the fact that both players are utilizing value iteration
to minimize their losses. However, the value function tra-
jectory that player one follows is always bounded between
the thresholds we derived from Proposition 11. As Figure 2
shows, there does not seem to be any direct correlation be-
tween player two’s discount factor and player one’s value
function. However, the interval bounds we derived do tightly
approximate resulting value function trajectories.
Alternatively, suppose we know that player two has the same
discount factor as player one, but we do not know player
two’s initial value function or if it is minimizing or maxi-
mizing its discounted objective. We analyze both scenarios:
0.0
0.5
1.0
k = 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
V(
s)
k = 49
= 0.10
= 0.20
= 0.30
= 0.40
= 0.50
= 0.60
= 0.70
= 0.80
= 0.90
= 1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
States
0.0
0.5
1.0
k = 99
Fig. 2. Player one’s value function as a function of state at different
iterations k = {1, 49, 99}. Range shown in blue is the bounded
interval V = [V k, V k] at the corresponding iteration k.
when player two is also minimizing its cost and when player
two is maximizing its cost. In Figure 3, the infinity norm
of player one’s value function at each iteration k is shown
with respect to these two scenarios. Both player one and
player two’s initial value function is randomly initialized as
V 0s ∈ [0, 1], ∀ s ∈ [S]. Figure 3 only plots player one’s
value function: the dotted trajectories are when player two is
minimizing its own value function and the solid trajectories
are when player two is maximizing its own value function.
The grey region shows the predicted bounds as derived from
Proposition 11.
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5
Iterations (k)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
||V
||
Fig. 3. The infinity norm of player one’s value functions as a
function of iteration k.
As Figure 3 shows, player two’s policy change causes a
significant shift in player one’s value function trajectory.
When the opponent player is attempting to maximize its own
cost parameter, player one’s function achieves the absolute
lower bound as predicted by Proposition 21. This is due to
the fact that at least four actions with different costs are
12
available at each state. Since both players are only selecting
from deterministic policies, they are bound to select different
actions unless all actions have the exact same cost. On the
contrary, if player two is also attempting to minimize its
value function, then both players would precisely select the
same state-actions at every time step. Then depending on
the coupling matrix A, they may or may not choose a less
costly action at the next step. This causes both the limit cycle
behaviour that the dotted trajectories displace. In terms of
the tightness of the bounds we derived in Proposition 11, we
note that Figure 3 also shows the existence of trajectories
which approach both the upper and lower bounds, therefore
in practice the set-based bounds are shown to be tight.
8 Conclusion
We’ve bounded the set of optimal value functions of the
set-based Bellman operator associated with a discounted in-
finite horizon MDP. Our results are motivated by bounding
optimal value functions of parameter uncertain MDPs and
value functions trajectories of a player in a stochastic games.
We demonstrate our example on a grid MDP and show that
while player one’s value functions do not converge, they
converge to the fixed point set of the set-based Bellman op-
erator in Hausdorff distance. Future work include extending
the set-based analysis to consider uncertainty in the tran-
sition kernels to fully bound value function trajectories of
learning algorithms in a general stochastic game.
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